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Enormous amounts of resources are being allocated for defensive cyber programs. 
The White House’s Cyber Security National Action Plan proposes a 35% increase in 
federal spending on cyber security during Fiscal Year 2017.  Without an appropriate 
understanding of how well the people, processes, defenses, and risk are measured, there 
will naturally be unproductive tasking, inefficient spending and ineffective reporting. In 
2016, the White House established the Commission on enhancing National Cybersecurity 
to assess the state of our nation’s cybersecurity posture. The report recognized both the 
difficulty and the need to develop meaningful metrics for cybersecurity in order to better 
secure the cyber landscape as it pertained to the broader digital ecosystem and its 
connection to our economy, government, and defense. The commission focused on both 
the private sector as well as the government and suggested the need to perfect policies, 
practices and technologies. Additionally, the Marine Corps University recently released 
research topics addressing some of the most important concerns affecting warfighters. 
One of the concerns was the lack of a methodology for determining the performance of 
Defensive Cyber Operations (DCO). Specifically addressed was a need to better 
understand how actions taken by network defenders facilitate network protection. 
Previous analysis of this topic led to a reactive and un-actionable approach which was 
tied to negative events such as the quantity and category of incident reports.   As there is 
currently no framework or scorecard built to evaluate DCO as a whole effort, a 
methodical approach was taken to scope the problem, compare existing frameworks, 
develop a framework, and present a scorecard. 
The first phase of research required scoping exactly what is involved in DCO at 
the most basic level and understanding how the DoD evaluates performance. This 
resulted in an understanding of the actionability of metrics, the levels of warfare, and the 
counterbalance of cyber asymmetry. Also identified was the military doctrine for 
assessments, which frames evaluations in terms of Measures of Effectiveness and 
Measures of Performance and supports continuous assessments that provide actionable 
information to decision makers.  The second phase required a detailed analysis of existing 
frameworks that measured related functions of cybersecurity. Specifically utilized were 
industry accepted compliance, incident handling, governance, and risk management 
frameworks. The outcome identified four functional areas common to most frameworks; 
people, processes, defenses, and risk. The third phase involved developing a framework 
that evaluated the four functional areas of DCO identified in the problem-framing phase, 
utilizing the most appropriate features of the already established frameworks. A key facet 
of this evaluation was that assessments should be weighed over time to demonstrate 
progress but also be measured against standards, peers, and the adversary. The final phase 
identified the continuous reporting criteria and the tangible mechanism for evaluating an 
organization in terms of a scorecard.  
The framework is not a static list of measurements but rather supports tailoring 
metrics to the organization’s specific requirements. The fundamentals of the framework 
are organized into elements, levels, categories, ends/ways, and measures. These metrics 
should be documented utilizing a standardized rubric that assesses the capability and 
performance of the metrics. The results should be reviewed and analyzed to determine 
trends, areas for improvement or investment and actionable information to support 
decision making. Additionally, a modified Delphi analysis with expert consensus 
validated the major concepts put forward in this paper. Overall, this research provides a 
comprehensive framework to evaluate the performance of Defensive Cyber Operations in 
terms of people, processes, defenses, and risk, filling a knowledge gap that is increasingly 
vital.   
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION	
 The purpose of this research was to ascertain a comprehensive framework for 
assessing the effectiveness of Defensive Cyber Operations (DCO).  Defensive Cyber 
Operations is an encompassing military term for cyberspace operations designed to 
preserve the ability to utilize friendly cyberspace.  
Enormous amounts of resources are being allocated for defensive cyber programs. 
The White House’s strategy to create the Cyber Security National Action Plan is a perfect 
example. The plan proposes a 35% increase in federal spending on cybersecurity during 
Fiscal Year 2017.1 Yet, without an appropriate understanding of how well the people, 
processes, and defenses reduce risk to the network, there will naturally be unproductive 
tasking, inefficient spending and ineffective reporting. Specifically, this information must 
be framed in a manner that our commanders can understand and use to take action.  
In 2016, the White House established the Commission on enhancing National 
Cybersecurity to assess the state of our nation’s cybersecurity posture. The report 
recognized both the difficulty and the need to develop meaningful metrics for 
cybersecurity in order to better secure the cyber landscape as it pertained to the broader 
digital ecosystem and its connection to our economy, government, and defense. The 
																																																											
1	Whitehouse.gov	
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commission focused on both the private sector as well as the government and suggested 
the need to perfect policies, practices and technologies.2   
The Marine Corps University recently released research topics addressing some of 
the most important concerns affecting warfighters. One of the concerns was the lack of a 
methodology for determining the performance of DCO. Specifically, addressed was a 
need to better understand how actions taken by network defenders facilitate network 
protection. Previous analysis of this topic led to a reactive and un-actionable approach 
which was tied to negative events such as the quantity and category of incident reports.3  
As there is currently no comprehensive framework or scorecard built to evaluate DCO as 
a whole effort, a methodical approach was taken to scope the problem, compare existing 
frameworks, develop a framework, and present a scorecard.  
The first phase of research required scoping exactly what is involved in DCO at 
the most basic level and understanding how the DoD evaluates performance.  This 
resulted in an understanding of the actionability of metrics, the levels of warfare, and the 
counterbalance of cyber asymmetry.  Also identified was the military doctrine for 
assessments which frames evaluations in terms of Measures of Effectiveness and 
Measures of Performance and supports continuous assessments that provide actionable 
information to decision makers.  The second phase required a detailed analysis of existing 
frameworks that measured related functions of cybersecurity. Specifically utilized were 
industry accepted compliance, incident handling, governance, and risk management 
																																																											
2	Report	on	Securing	and	Growing	the	Digital	Economy	
3	"Marine	Corps	Research	Topics	AY	2016-2017."	Marine	Corps	University	
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frameworks. The outcome identified four functional areas common to most frameworks; 
people, processes, defenses, and risk. The third phase involved developing a framework 
that evaluated the four functional areas of DCO identified in the problem-framing phase, 
utilizing the most appropriate features of the already established frameworks. A key facet 
of this evaluation recognized that assessments should be weighed over time to 
demonstrate progress but also be measured against standards, peers, and the adversary. 
The final phase identifies the continuous reporting criteria and the tangible mechanism 
for evaluating an organization in terms of a scorecard. The framework should not be a 
static list of measurements but rather support tailoring the metrics to the organization’s 
specific requirements. The final results should be reviewed and analyzed to determine 
trends, areas for improvement or investment and actionable information to support 
decision making.  
The framework is not a static list of measurements but rather supports tailoring 
metrics to the organization’s specific requirements. The fundamentals of the framework 
are organized into elements, levels, categories, ends/ways, and measures. These metrics 
should be documented utilizing a standardized rubric that assesses the capability and 
performance of the metrics. The results should be reviewed and analyzed to determine 
trends, areas for improvement or investment and actionable information to support 
decision making. Additionally, a modified Delphi analysis with expert consensus 
validated the major concepts put forward in this paper. Overall, this research provides a 
comprehensive framework to evaluate the performance of Defensive Cyber Operations in 
	
	
4	
terms of people, processes, defenses, and risk, filling a knowledge gap that is increasingly 
vital.   
Scope	
This paper seeks to provide a thorough account of the functional nature of DCO 
by utilizing unclassified DoD publications, academic research, and industry white papers 
in order to frame the problem and propose a solution. A single concept for assessing the 
performance of DCO will empower the community to standardize reporting, increase 
command and control and improve defenses. The scope of this paper primarily focuses on 
improving processes within the DoD, however the general concepts put forward should 
empower other federal agencies with similarly structured cyber defenses. Additionally, 
the same struggle in measuring cybersecurity has been plaguing commercial enterprises 
for years. Although the specific metrics put forward may not be as relevant to the private 
sector, the general concepts may well hold weight, especially within the financial, 
telecommunications, and energy industries.  
Defensive Cyber Operations (DCO) 
DCO is an intangible categorization of numerous actions that provide freedom of 
maneuver in cyberspace. It is much more than the civilian construct of cybersecurity. Yet, 
at its core, remain the same objectives of confidentiality, integrity, and availability. The 
DoD has done its best to structure cybersecurity into three encompassing missions: 
Department of Defense Information Network Operations (DODIN Ops); Defensive 
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Cyberspace Operations Internal Defensive Measures (DCO-IDM); Defensive Cyberspace 
Operations Response Actions (DCO-RA). 4   
The first mission is DODIN Ops, which includes the planning, installing, 
operating, maintaining, and securing of the Department of Defense Information Network 
(DODIN).  It is important to note that DODIN Ops are not considered part of DCO. In 
many cases, it is a disparate dimension focused primarily on the availability of the 
network without due emphasis on confidentiality or integrity. Joint Publication 3-12 
separates DCO into Internal Defensive Measures and Response Actions.  DODIN Ops 
are normally considered information technology (IT) functions that are carried out by 
system administrators and network engineers.5 Many organizations have pigeonholed 
DODIN Ops into this role, discounting the umbrella notion that DODIN Ops supports 
DCO. The key concept to understand is that DODIN Ops should create a secure baseline	
in the layered defense in depth strategy of the DODIN. In this mission, the DoD must be 
able to assess its ability to execute tasks such as patching vulnerabilities, encrypting data, 
and training users. While, DODIN Ops is not doctrinally an entity of DCO it needs to be 
considered a supporting role and thus comprehensively evaluated.    
 The second mission that provides the freedom of maneuver within cyberspace is 
DCO-IDM. The baseline security architecture provided by DODIN Ops is not capable of 
defending against a determined and persistent adversary. Thus, internal defensive 
measures are mission focused and threat specific actions that complement the limited 
																																																											
4	JP	3-12	Cyberspace	Operations	
5	Williams,	Brett	T.	"The	Joint	Force	Commander’s	Guide	to	Cyberspace	Operations."	
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security of DODIN Ops. The objective is to detect and mitigate threats to the operating 
environment by outmaneuvering the adversary. A key tenant of DCO-IDM is the 
identification and prioritization of key terrain within cyberspace and a complementary 
defense dedicated to counter the enemy’s capabilities.6 Specific tasks within DCO-IDM 
include the identification of threats through hunting and the implementation of custom 
signatures for active blocking and alerting. Followed actions include incident response, 
reporting, sharing of intelligence, and the employment of countermeasures. Internal 
defensive measures respond to malicious activity, threats, and alerts leveraging 
intelligence while prioritizing cyber key terrain. 7  
While DCO-IDM refers to measures and countermeasures applied within the 
DODIN, DCO-RA are actions taken outside the DODIN. DCO-RA must be deliberate, 
authorized and taken only to defeat ongoing or imminent threats in accordance with the 
standing rules of engagement. Assessing the effectiveness of DCO-RA is not within the 
scope of this paper.  
																																																											
6	Williams,	Brett	T.	"The	Joint	Force	Commander’s	Guide	to	Cyberspace	Operations."	
7	JP	3-12	Cyberspace	Operations	
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Figure 1. DODIN Ops and DCO Missions 
Assessments	
 To put forward a useful framework for evaluating DCO, we must explore the 
nature of how the DoD measures success and mission accomplishment. Joint Publication 
3-60, Joint Targeting describes the purpose of assessments as the measure of progress 
toward mission accomplishment. This is a continuous process that commanders must 
gauge to understand progress towards their desired end state.8 This continuous nature of 
assessments in cyberspace enables commanders at all levels to make decisions about the 
deployment of cyber defense forces, tools, and sensors.  
 The assessment process should begin during planning and be re-evaluated 
throughout the preparation and execution of a given mission. This process assists the 
commander’s staff in deciding what and how to measure success. Therefore, the DoD 
would decide how to assess DCO actions prior to the engineering of their networks, the 
																																																											
8	JP	3-60	Joint	Targeting	
	
	
8	
establishment of sensor grids, and the employment of internal defensive measures. 
However, a major struggle with evaluating DCO operations is that most networks are 
already built and sensor grids already established. Thus the measurements that are 
derived today may be inadequate or require a significant investment of time and money to 
implement.  
 Assessments occur at all levels of command. MCDP 1 Warfighting, defines three 
interrelated levels of war which must be used to understand all other concepts. The 
strategic level consists of establishing goals, assigning forces, and providing assets. The 
tactical level describes the methods we use to achieve a mission. The operational level of 
war joins the strategic and tactical levels in that it is the use of tactical effects to attain 
strategic goals.9 In terms of DCO, leaders need to ensure our metrics for success and the 
models we use to report those measurements provide an effective assessment at all three 
levels of warfare. 
 Joint doctrine states that at each level of war, operations are evaluated utilizing 
two different forms of metrics. Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) are used to evaluate 
changes in system performance, capability, or the operational environment. These 
measures are designed to express a trend toward or away from a military objective. 
Measures of Performance (MOP) are intended to assess changes that are tied to an end 
state. 10A simpler way of looking at these two ideas is that MOE measure the ends and 
MOP measure the ways. Looking back at the levels of warfare, MOE and MOP are 
																																																											
9	MCDP1	Warfighting	
10	JP	3-12	Cyberspace	Operations	
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inherently related, and a MOP at one level may be a MOE at another.  The traditional 
example states that our desired endstate at the operational level is to reduce enemy 
movement. An MOE would be the amount of enemy movement from current positions. 
The MOP would be the amount of bridges that were destroyed. At the tactical level the 
endstate would be the destruction of a particular bridge. The MOE would be the level of 
bridge destruction and the MOP would be whether that mission was flown on time and 
the correct ordinance was delivered.  
In terms of DCO, we could state that our desired endstate at the operational level 
is to isolate a rapidly spreading malware infection. An MOE would be the amount of 
hosts that were compromised by lateral movement. A MOP would be the number of 
routers that were reconfigured to isolate infected LANs. And then at the tactical level the 
endstate would be the reconfiguring of a particular core router. The MOE may be the 
level of isolation and its impact on the tenant of availability and the MOP may be 
whether certain ports and protocols were still aloud access to other networks. 
 Assessments are especially effective if they incorporate both quantitative and 
qualitative analysis. Reliance on either raw data or human opinion easily skews the 
assessment process, yet when they work in concert a balanced picture of reality is 
revealed. 11 Additionally, according to NIST Special Publication 800-137, effective 
metrics yield specific, measurable, actionable, relevant, and timely information. 12 
																																																											
11	Commander’s	Handbook	for	Assessment	Planning	and	Execution	
12	NIST	SP	800-137	Information	Security	Continuous	Monitoring	(ISCM)	for	Federal	Information	Systems	
and	Organizations	
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 Metrics vary in scale and purpose from situational awareness to actionable 
information. While neither should be outright discounted, for the purpose of determining 
the overall efficacy of an organization, management should strive to provide leadership 
actionable metrics that can be used for decision-making. For example, a situational 
awareness metric could be the number of closed incident reports last month. This 
information by itself may be used to provide situational awareness on incident reporting 
trends, and may potentially be used to develop future manpower requirements when 
combined with other metrics. However, a more actionable metric would be the number of 
reports in which the adversary was able to achieve milestones towards their objective on 
the DODIN, such as users opening spearphishing links or attachments. Leadership could 
then choose to conduct organizational level training if the numbers are high. 
 
 
Figure 2. Actionable Metric Scale 
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MCDP 1-3, defines asymmetry as “a means of gaining the advantage through 
imbalance, applying strength against an enemy weakness.”13 Asymmetric Warfare means 
fighting the enemy in terms that are advantageous to us and in ways in which traditional 
military capabilities such as superior manpower is not necessary. Symmetric Warfare 
entails the use of similar capabilities, such as utilizing ground forces to fight ground 
forces. However, asymmetric warfare would capitalize on advantageous capabilities such 
as airpower to fight ground forces in open terrain. In terms of Cyberspace, Defensive 
Cyber Operations as well as Offensive Cyber Operations are both symmetric as well as 
asymmetric. 
 The symmetric nature of Offensive Cyber Operations is clear. To a certain degree, 
all actors must operate on a relatively even playing field. Open source penetration tools, 
access to the internet, and standard protocols such as IPv4 and IPv6 stabilize the 
environment, reducing the gap between a highly resourced actor and a low resourced 
actor. Defensive Cyber Operations are also commonly recognized as symmetric in nature. 
The public disclosure of vulnerabilities and the sharing of indicators of compromise 
through common reporting sources like Virus Total and others, assists defender’s in 
reacting and preparing for an attack. Additionally, readily available open source 
defensive tools and public encryption standards provide the means for most defenders to 
provide confidentiality, integrity, and availability of their organization’s data for a 
relatively low budget.  
																																																											
13	Marine	Corps	Doctrinal	Publication	1-3	Tactics	
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Sophisticated actors may capitalize on the asymmetric aspects of both defensive 
and offensive cyberspace operations. An asymmetric offense may gain advantage over a 
defender by applying the strength of a large botnet or the scalability of cloud 
infrastructure to conduct a distributed denial of service attack against a defender’s critical 
vulnerability. An attacker may also develop or purchase zero day exploits to gain an 
asymmetric advantage over the defender’s signature based sensors. Technological 
research into the domain of quantum computing may eventually grant an asymmetric 
advantage to the attacker that is able to leverage advanced cryptanalysis and break secret 
messages in a fraction of the time it takes conventional cryptanalysis systems.  
The defense may also take advantage of asymmetric tactics and tools. Non-
signature based sensors that utilize heuristics and detect anomalies may counteract zero 
day attacks. Artificial intelligence based sensors and big data analytics may predict and 
mitigate future attacks. Cloud based services may be equally useful to the defender, 
enabling the agile pivot from virtual infrastructure to virtual infrastructure.  For each 
asymmetric attack, it seems there is also an asymmetric defense. One of the main findings 
the Cyber National Action team presented in their 2016 report to the President was that 
both offense and defense adopt the same innovations. Specifically addressed were topics 
such as machine learning, artificial intelligence and advances in encryption technologies 
which may be used for offense and defense. 14 
 
																																																											
14	Report	on	Securing	and	Growing	the	Digital	Economy	
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Figure 3. Cyber Asymmetry 
In itself these attacks and their countermeasures reveal an overall symmetric 
environment in which asymmetric strategies and tools can be implemented to gain an 
advantage. However, in general, asymmetric strategies and tools cost resources. The 
attacker or defender that can spend more, process more, or mount more man hours than 
their opponent should be able to gain the advantage. However, according to another 
finding in the report on Securing and Growing the Digital Economy, the attacker has the 
default advantage. A less skilled actor can purchase tools, botnets for hire, and even 
receive technical support to attack a network for a fraction of the cost to defend it. 15 
When possible, we should attempt to utilize the asymmetric capabilities of DCO 
and assess the effectiveness of these capabilities.  As resources, such as financial capital, 
processing power, and human resources assist an organization in gaining the asymmetric 
advantage within the cyber domain, economy of force strategies should be applied that 
																																																											
15	Report	on	Securing	and	Growing	the	Digital	Economy	
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expand the ability of machines to execute the decision process and minimize the need for 
human interaction. Additionally, careful attention should be paid to the return on 
investment of tools, to ensure the appropriate use of resources.  
A worthwhile framework does not simply dictate a list of metrics that all 
organizations should measure. This is because metrics are not equally actionable at all 
levels. A tactical level metric being reported at the enclave may not be useful to the Chief 
Information Officer (CIO) of the enterprise. Yet this is how reporting is too often 
conducted.  Many of the metrics that are currently utilized fall heavily to the left side of 
the scale and the same metrics are employed at all levels.  
Challenges 
There are many issues that have prevented a single concept for evaluating DCO. 
First, there are numerous dimensions of DCO, from incident handling and response to 
intelligence and reporting. Many cybersecurity frameworks explore a single dimension of 
DCO. While these models may provide an increased understanding of specific concepts, 
they generally do not provide a means to evaluate how successful an organization is at 
DCO as a whole. Furthermore, DoD doctrine often separates the functional nature of 
cybersecurity into compliance and network hardening (DODIN Ops) and hunting and 
response actions (DCO-IDM). This fractional method of evaluating DCO as a partial 
concept means that we are not providing the commander with an adequate representation 
of how our conceptual shield is prepared for enemy engagement.  
As with any system, planning for how we will evaluate the effectiveness of that 
system will ideally be completed before the process or procedure will be put into place. 
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This ensures there are tools engineered into the plan to capture the metrics needed. 
However, the unique challenge of DCO is that the network is already built, sensor grids 
already firmly established, and reporting processes already developed. This particular 
challenge may be overcome with a significant amount of planning, time, and fiscal 
resources. Yet, another option would be to completely rebuild the network from the 
ground up. While this paper does not focus on this idea, it does support it. Many 
organizations are experimenting with virtual networks that can be completely set up and 
torn down in a matter of minutes. This restructuring of the network would enable 
management to reestablish tools and processes to provide the most useful metrics 
possible.   
The DODIN is a disparate network of networks, operated by many services and 
agencies. Each organization defends its network according to policies dictated by its 
higher-level cyber component. This mesh has created an incongruent reporting structure 
that is not only difficult to defend, but nearly impossible to assess. The recent creation of 
Joint Force Headquarters – DODIN has sought to provide cohesion to this mesh. Yet, this 
transformation is still developing and there is no clear framework or model for how to 
measure and evaluate the success of DCO throughout the DODIN. However, the DoD 
has made tremendous progress in improving standardized reporting of compliance 
through the adoption of the DOD CIO’s Cybersecurity Scorecard, which will be covered 
later.16 
																																																											
16	DoD	Cybersecurity	Discipline	Implementation	Plan	
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Additionally, most frameworks focus specifically on incident handling and do not 
evaluate success against an adversary or even a peer organization. Others such as 
Lockheed Martin’s Cyber Kill Chain do provide a quality concept for understanding how 
an organization should analyze and respond to an adversary intrusion. Yet, it does not 
provide a mechanism for continually evaluating success or failure. Without a framework 
to continuously evaluate DCO as a whole of effort, commander’s resort to infrequent 
security audits, vulnerability assessments, and penetration test. While certainly useful, 
these tests only give a commander insight into a snapshot of DCO. It is also a common 
misconception that organizations are conducting cybersecurity well if they have not been 
hacked or are not in the news. This fallacy may provide the organization with a false 
sense of confidence and may result in management not identifying areas for 
improvement.   
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CHAPTER II 
FRAMEWORKS 
 The Department of Defense (DoD), defense contractors, and the private sector 
have developed many different frameworks for understanding information and security.   
The next phase of research consists of a detailed literature review that examines the most 
prevalent frameworks, analyzing their strengths and weaknesses for assessing Defensive 
Cyber Operations (DCO). In order to organize this exposition cogently, the following 
categories of frameworks were chosen; risk management incident handling, compliance, 
and governance.  
Risk Management Frameworks 
 Risk management is perhaps the most important indicator of the effectiveness of a 
cybersecurity program. Defensive Cyberspace Operations Internal Defensive Measures 
(DCO-IDM) and Department of Defense Information Network Operations (DODIN Ops) 
should both be assessed by their ability to effectively manage risk.  
NIST Risk Management Framework 
 The Risk Management Framework (RMF) is the approved certification and 
accreditation process for DoD information systems. The RMF is a six-step process that 
assigns tasks and responsibilities that must be accomplished prior to a system being put 
online, during the system’s lifecycle, and throughout decommissioning. The Risk 
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Management Framework promotes the idea of real time risk management through 
continuous monitoring. The concept of continuous monitoring will be examined under 
the compliance frameworks but is tied back to the higher level RMF.17  
 The RMF is a checklist of tasks that form the baseline security posture for the 
DoDIN. The process ensures that both technical and administrative controls are applied 
to an information system prior to being put on the network. In step 1, the system is 
categorized, described, and registered. Step 2 calls for the identification and selection of 
security controls. Most importantly, step 2 requires the development of a continuous 
monitoring of these security controls and their effectiveness. This is then codified into a 
security plan, which is approved by the authorizing official. Step 3 involves the 
implementation and documentation of security controls.  Step 4 of the RMF requires a 
process for developing, reviewing, and approving a plan to assess security controls. 
These controls are then assessed; a report generated, and initial remedial actions taken. In 
step 5, the information system is authorized, but only after a Plan of Action and 
Milestones (POA&M) has been developed for any findings identified in step 4 that could 
not be quickly remediated. Finally, a risk assessment is conducted based on the security 
assessment and POA&M. If the risk is acceptable then the authorizing official will 
accredit the system.18 
 The final step stands alone from the accreditation process. Step 6 involves the 
continuous monitoring of the information system after it has been connected to the 
																																																											
17	NIST	SP	800-37	Guide	for	Applying	the	Risk	Management	Framework	to	Federal	Information	Systems	
18	NIST	SP	800-37	Guide	for	Applying	the	Risk	Management	Framework	to	Federal	Information	Systems	
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network. Here, changes to the information system and environment are assessed 
according to the security impact. Technical, management, and operational controls are 
also continuously monitored and remediated. The security plan is updated and the 
security status, to include effectiveness, is reported to leadership.  
This continuous assessment needs to be tied back to the incident handling process 
in which each incident is considered a change to the environment and forces step 6 of the 
RMF to be initiated. Each time an incident occurs, a scored evaluation of the overall risk 
to the information system is evaluated and processed, which affects the overall evaluation 
of all other connected information systems. In this way, a commander or authorizing 
official can understand the total risk to their affected networks.  
The problem with the RMF, like the other frameworks discussed in this paper, is 
that it does not provide a thorough understanding of how to measure security controls. 
Standing alone, this framework is an excellent guide for accrediting a system but it only 
assesses the information system defenses and subsequent risk to the system according to 
the controls developed in the security plan. This oversight does not evaluate the people or 
the processes, against adversaries, peers, or standards.  
Incident Handling Frameworks 
Incident Handling is perhaps one of the most important functions of DCO. It 
covers the largest part of DCO-IDM in that it is these actions that are taken in response to 
threat activity on the network. 
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CJCSM 6510.01B Incident Handling 
The DoD has already established a Cyber Incident Framework that provides a 
meaningful understanding of incident handling. However, it is focused on providing 
situational awareness reporting of attacks and does not address evaluation, although many 
of the metrics that an organization needs to assess incident handling are required to be 
reported in this framework. The Computer Network Defense (CND) Framework is a 
tiered defense in-depth model that is organized into three layers; global, regional, and 
local. Each of these tiers is responsible for executing three defined CND services. The 
first is to protect. The second is to monitor, analyze, and detect. The last is to respond. 
The framework also includes a fourth category for capability sustainment. This represents 
how an organization maintains its training, policies, procedures, and contracts.19 
One of the most significant strengths of the CND is its focus on the cyber incident 
life cycle phases and its relationship to the OODA loop. The OODA loop is a process for 
analyzing and increasing efficiency of each phase of a decision cycle; observe, orient, 
decide, and act.  The incident handling life cycle chronologically characterizes the 
appropriate steps that should be taken in response to an incident. These steps include the 
detection of the event, preliminary analysis and identification, preliminary response 
actions, incident analysis, response and recovery, and post-incident analysis. This logical 
process encourages network defenders to evaluate their progress in terms of flash to bang 
or more commonly known as time intervals.  Yet, this framework goes one step farther 
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and abstractly addresses these intervals in terms of the iterative decision cycle known as 
the OODA loop, encouraging its adoption without providing clear guidance as to how to 
employ it. 
Perhaps the greatest achievement of CJCSM 6510.01B is its decree for 
standardized reporting and the mechanism to achieve such reports. The reportable 
information is designed to be input into the Joint Incident Management System (JIMS) 
which is the tool the DoD uses to report, track, and search for incident tickets.20 This is 
significant because it is one of the main mechanisms the DoD currently uses for 
analyzing reporting metrics. Aside from basic incident characteristics, this document 
requires events to be categorized by the significance of the event. It also states that 
organizations must identify additional characteristics of the incident including the 
delivery vector, system weaknesses, and root cause. These characteristics are useful for 
correlation and trending, and can provide insight into how successful or unsuccessful the 
people, strategies, and technologies are at defending the network.  Additional 
characteristics include the Battle Damage Assessment or the impact assessment, which 
includes the technical and operational impacts of an incident. This is important because if 
management can show that throughout the last X number of incidents, the technical and 
operational impact has been low than despite the overall quantity of DCO events, systems 
are providing an adequate level of defense. This is especially true if there is no mission 
impact to task critical assets or those assets which are critical to accomplishing a unit’s 
mission essential function.  
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This document provides standardized reporting timelines that organizations 
should use to measure how well they are performing compared to a set requirement. 
Specifically, it provides timelines for how long each organization must report to the next 
tier. However, the genius of this model is that it combines the category of incident with 
the impact to provide the reportable timeline. 
There are a few major drawbacks with assessing DCO by this framework. Most 
importantly, it only frames DCO in terms of incidents. Additionally, through no fault of 
the framework, standardized reporting is difficult to fully achieve. Without an effective 
and homogeneous enforcement of reporting, measuring the success of one’s organization 
can only be measured internally. While internal measures of effectiveness are useful if 
they can be measured against adversarial action or even show progress over time, they 
lose some of their value if they cannot be evaluated against a peer organization. This also 
reduces the ability of higher organizations to set goals for subordinates. 
Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain 
Another widely accepted framework within the security industry is Lockheed 
Martin’s Cyber Kill Chain (CKC). The CKC is an intelligence based approach to 
computer network defense. This model focuses on identifying and preventing intrusions 
at the earliest stage of an attack. This model is unique because it demonstrates how the 
defender has the advantage. An attacker must successfully accomplish every stage of the 
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attack in order to achieve success. The defender can break this cycle at any phase, thus 
inoculating the attack.21 
In order to develop the CKC, Lockheed Martin analysts reviewed many of the 
NIST publications. In 2012, NIST published the “Computer Security Incident Handling 
Guide” SP 800-61 Rev 2. The key take away from this revision was that it incorporated 
post incident activity into preparation for future incidents. Lockheed Martin based its new 
model off of this intelligence feedback loop. 22 Utilizing this feedback model, they 
revolutionized the process from a defender-focused defense to an attacker focused 
defense.  
The seven phases of the CKC include; Reconnaissance, Weaponization, Delivery, 
Exploitation, Installation, Command and Control, and Actions on Objectives. 23 
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Figure 4. Cyber Kill Chain 
Reconnaissance – Target selection, Open Source Intelligence, Scanning 
Weaponization – Development of malware, exploit, or payload for the attack  
Delivery – Transmission of the weaponized payload, spearphishing email, 
malicious website, removable media 
Exploitation – Execution of malicious code 
Installation – Installation of backdoor or persistence on the target 
Command and Control (C2) – Establishment of C2 channel that provides the 
attacker the ability to interact with the target 
Actions on objective – Actions that compromise the confidentiality, integrity, or 
availability of the target.  
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Lockheed Martin has identified a number of applications to implement the kill 
chain framework. Understanding these applications supports a greater understanding of 
how we can measure the effectiveness of our organizations ability to conduct DCO. The 
first application is to prioritize sensor alerts by the phase of the CKC. Enterprise sensors 
provide millions and millions of alerts each day. It is not feasible for a human to 
investigate each alert, thus they must be triaged in a way that ranks alerts. Lockheed 
Martin suggests associating events to sensors and events to CKC phase.  In this way 
higher priority alerts, those that correspond with phases farther along in the kill chain, are 
investigated quicker.24 Management can use this method to determine how well 
organization are triaging alerts. A similar application is to utilize the CKC phase for 
escalation and notification to leadership. For example, incidents associated with actions 
on objective or command and control should receive the attention of leadership. The 
currently adopted model previously described in CJCSM 6510.01B prioritizes the 
triaging and notification timelines for incidents by simple category and impact. While 
this method was revolutionary at one time, its initial assessment of impact is a simple 
matrix that associates category of event by the network device that is affected. For 
example, a Category 1 or root level intrusion on a workstation is assessed as low impact 
where a Category 7 or malware event is assessed as moderate impact. Utilizing the CKC 
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model for triage enables us to better communicate to leadership how far an intrusion has 
progressed. 25 
Another application for the CKC helps an organization identify gaps in sensor 
coverage. By comparing the CKC to the cyberspace tasks outlined in JP 3-12, and filling 
in the table with the sensors and tools that achieve each objective at that phase of the 
CKC, an organization can identify gaps in sensor coverage and prioritize investment. 26 
 
 Detect Deny Disrupt Degrade Deceive 
Reconnaissance      
Weaponization      
Delivery      
Exploitation      
Installation      
Command & 
Control 
     
Actions on 
Objective 
     
Figure 5. Sensor/Tools Gaps 
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 However there is a major problem with this approach. It overemphasizes the fact 
that an attack need only be stopped at one place in the CKC. Most organizations rely on a 
Defense in Depth approach to layering their countermeasures. Thus this framework 
would benefit from adding a third dimension that represents the logical layers of defense. 
This would demonstrate the gaps in coverage at each layer. Another issue with the CKC 
is that it is framed around the typical adversary, which is remotely attempting to 
compromise the network. This specific analysis limits management’s ability to use the   
CKC as an overall DCO framework. Insider threats, both intentional and unintentional, 
cannot be clearly assessed within the confounds of reconnaissance, weaponization, 
delivery, exploitation, installation, command and control, and actions on objective. An 
argument could be made that insider threat and non-compliance activities would 
automatically be placed within the ring of actions on objective. Yet, according to this 
scenario, the attacker is able to succeed bypassing the defenses setup to break the kill 
chain.  
 The most important parts of the framework for the purposes of this paper are its 
ability to measure the effectiveness of defenses. A key metric is the phase in which the 
intrusion was stopped. Ideally, this metric would be utilized over a period of time to 
demonstrate a trend of stopping an adversary higher and higher in the chain as 
countermeasures are developed and implemented. Additionally, the CKC can be utilized 
to measure resilience, in that if an attack is stopped at one phase of the CKC, it would be 
stopped in a lower phase or multiple phases. Over time, improvement in resilience 
confirms a robust, layered, and effective defense. Lockheed Martin proposes an 
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effectiveness scorecard that shows the efficacy and resilience of an organization based on 
where the intrusion was stopped and where alternative countermeasures are in place for 
each threat actor campaign. Additionally, this scorecard could be utilized to justify the 
return on investment for each tool based on how well it blocked or could have blocked an 
attack. 27 
There are many strengths to consider when reviewing the CKC. Distinctively, 
utilizing the perspective of an attacker to hone your defenses means an organization is 
focused on defending against specific threats rather than a defense of everything, which is 
really a defense of nothing. Additionally, it provides a detailed understanding of the 
threat actor and how they executed their attack. This intelligence on the capabilities and 
intent of the actor can be used against them in future attacks.  
NIST Cybersecurity Framework 
The next framework to explore is the NIST Cybersecurity Framework. NIST 
presents a risk-based approach to improving the security of critical infrastructure within 
both the private and public sector. The framework’s core elements include functions, 
categories, subcategories, and informative references of cyber security. These 
components are assembled into a graphical table that provides an organization with 
guidance in determining what activities they should be doing to achieve specific cyber 
security outcomes. While NIST emphasizes the need for each organization to align this 
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framework to their particular organization needs, they do accentuate five key functions 
which all organizations must accomplish; identify, protect, detect, respond, and recover.28 
The end state of completing this table is to develop a profile that determines gaps 
within the five functions listed above. This profile is then graded on a tiered system that 
measures how well an organization has implemented the framework and thus reduced 
risk. The Cybersecurity Framework does not measure the effectiveness of an 
organization’s ability to conduct DCO. Rather, it is a theoretical framework for 
implementing activities to reduce risk. The strength of the Cybersecurity Framework is 
the development of the five key functions, the structure of the table, and the ability to 
apply the framework to almost any organization.  
Compliance Frameworks 
 Compliance is generally considered a DODIN Ops function and does not always 
receive the attention it deserves from a DCO perspective.  However, the DoD is 
beginning to refocus the need to shore up basic cybersecurity requirements to reduce the 
attack surface. Per the Secretary of Defense, Ashton Carter, “Cyber defense of DoD 
systems is [my] highest cyber priority; if DoD systems are not dependable in the face of 
cyber warfare, all other DoD missions are at risk.”29  
Cybersecurity Scorecard 
In October 2015, the Department of Defense Chief Information Officer published 
the DoD Cybersecurity Discipline Implementation Plan. This document focused on 
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aligning DoD cyber security requirements by Lines of Effort. Each line of effort 
concentrates on a key aspect of cyber security that can be strengthened to better defend 
against adversaries. This plan utilizes compliance-based metrics to report the 
cybersecurity posture of tactical units up through strategic level service components and 
combatant commands through the use of the Defense Readiness Reporting System 
(DRRS).30 
DRRS delivers decision makers at every level of military command a quantitative 
readiness report capturing readiness metrics in near real time. Furthermore, business 
intelligence tools and readiness dashboards provide detailed analysis into the metrics 
being reported. Specifically, DRRS utilizes mission-essential tasks (MET) to identify a 
given unit’s responsibilities that are critical to the success of their mission. Metrics then 
derived from these METs are designed to demonstrate the effectiveness and the 
preparedness of the unit in question. 31 
The DoD CIO chose four lines of effort to build his DRRS report metrics. These 
lines of effort are in fact abstract goals and not in themselves measures of performance.  
The first line of effort is strong authentication. This line of effort ensures commanders 
posture their cyber defenses to require multi-factor authentication, strong encryption 
keys, and strict passwords. These requirements prevent unauthorized access of DoD 
systems and help ensure confidentiality and non-repudiation. The second line of effort is 
device hardening. Device hardening entails patching, configuration management, and 
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other endpoint security measures. The third effort is to reduce the attack surface, thereby 
making the DODIN simpler to defend and harder for the opponent to find weakness. The 
fourth line of effort is to align organizations to a Computer Network Defense Service 
Provider.  
The title “Cybersecurity Scorecard” is rather deceiving. It is not an all-
encompassing scorecard; rather it is strictly focused on compliance. It lacks metrics for 
DCO-IDM.   The main strength of this initiative is the mechanism for reporting. The 
DRRS reporting structure enables cyber reporting at each level of command and agency. 
These MOPs/MOEs are developed to provide an overall picture of how well the DoD is 
defending the DODIN. However, there is no room for tailoring specific DCO objectives 
to an organization. For example, commanders at the operational level cannot require their 
tactical units to report additional metrics than the metrics set forth at the strategic level. 
This lack of customization ultimately degrades the usefulness of the Cybersecurity 
Scorecard. The second weakness of the Cybersecurity Scorecard is the almost binary 
pass/fail approach to grading an organization. Compliance is a continuous objective that 
resets each time a change is made to the network or a new vulnerability needs patching. 
Thus a percentage demonstrating completeness would more accurately depict the 
defensive posture of an organization.  
NIST Continuous Monitoring Program 
NIST Special Publication 800-137 provides an essential analysis into the 
effectiveness of an organization through the perspective of risk tolerance. The strategy 
incorporates metrics that measure the technology, processes, procedures, operating 
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environment, and people, marking this framework the most comprehensive analysis of an 
organization’s cybersecurity status. The Information System Continuous Monitoring 
Program (ISCM) is a reiterative process of identifying problems, assessing those 
problems, and remediating them. Two measurements can be derived from this process; 
the speed it takes an organization to execute and the assessed risk along the way. 32 
Another benefit of implementing ISCM is that it provides an encompassing 
security status that assesses each information system individually and aggregates the 
information to provide an overall score much the same way that the Cybersecurity 
Scorecard attempts to do. Though the Cybersecurity Scorecard was built off the ISCM 
model, it only assesses very specific “problems” or vulnerabilities and does not provide a 
means to truly evaluate the effectiveness of an organization. Through the ISCM tiered 
approach, detailed security measurements are assessed and monitored using automated 
tools. Additionally, these metrics are not designed to remain static and should be 
constantly reassessed based off their relevance and actionability. 33  
Governance Frameworks 
Governance is a key concept involving the management of IT systems. In 
particular, DCO requires well-defined metrics that assess the performance of 
management in executing governance. There are many laws and frameworks relating to 
security governance. Perhaps the most important document outlining management’s roles 
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and responsibilities in an organization is derived from the Clinger – Cohen Act which in 
part defined the responsibilities of the DOD CIO. For the purposes of DCO, the major 
functions of the CIO can be consolidated into five responsibilities.34 
• Acquisition and investment 
• IT Architecture 
• Policy 
• Manpower development and training 
• Performance results and technology assessments 
However, Craig Simmons proposed a simplified IT governance framework that 
examined four similar dimensions of IT governance; IT value and alignment, risk 
management, accountability, and performance measurement. Simmons borrowed heavily 
from existing works in his assessment of the four dimensions of IT governance, utilizing 
frameworks such as Control Objectives for Information and related Technologies 
(COBIT) and the Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL). He argued that 
utilizing a combination of various governance frameworks provided the best value to an 
organization. 35 
COBIT 
The COBIT framework was designed as an auditing tool for IT organizations but 
has been expanded to form the baseline framework for the IT security of many 
organizations. The current version, COBIT 5.0, consists of five major principles that form 
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the core of the framework. The first principle involves meeting stakeholder’s needs. This 
process ensures that senior management has buy in for the IT alignment strategy and 
business needs are being assessed and met. Furthermore, it provides a tiered system that 
begins with enterprise goals and works its way down to IT related goals, and finally 
enabler goals.36 This concept is similar to how Mission Essential Tasks are derived in the 
military. Utilizing this approach, IT requirements are assessed at each level of an 
organization from the strategic to the tactical. COBIT takes these requirements farther by 
assessing their achievement through the use of a balanced scorecard. 37 
 Principle two, covering the enterprise end to end, provides a holistic approach for 
addressing governance and management of the IT organization. It joins governance 
requirements for the enterprise and those requirements specifically related to IT. Principle 
three advocates utilizing COBIT as a single and integrated framework because it has 
already completed integrating other frameworks into its core. Principle four is perhaps 
the most important aspect of COBIT, as it enables a holistic approach to IT governance. 
In this inclusive approach, COBIT 5 documents seven enablers that influence the success 
of an organization. 
• Principles, policies, and frameworks 
• Processes 
• Organizational Structures 
• Culture, ethics, and behavior 
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• Information 
• Services, infrastructure, and applications 
• People, skills, and competencies 
 These seven enablers are each associated with metrics that address how 
stakeholder’s needs are addressed, enabler goals achieved, life cycle managed, and 
whether good practices are applied. 38 However, in terms of applicability to a DCO 
framework, these seven enablers are so diverse that even these generic metrics need to be 
focused on the individual enabler itself. The concluding principle involves separating 
governance from management. Governance involves the determination of objectives as 
well as the monitoring of performance. Ideally this is separated from the management 
function that executes those objectives.  
 The final benefit of the COBIT framework is the utilization of a maturity 
capability model to assess an organization based on attributes and various levels of 
achievements. Each level of achievement has a pre-determined description explaining the 
degree of performance required to receive a particular grade.39  This is an improvement 
over the DOD CIO Cybersecurity Scorecard which merely assesses a pass/fail grade for 
each security metric. Additionally, this ensures a common standard amongst various 
governance personnel. 
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CHAPTER III 
PROPOSED FRAMEWORK 
A complete review of the above frameworks, concepts, and procedures identifies 
clear gaps in our ability to adequately assess how effective we are at Defensive Cyber 
Operations (DCO). Each framework stands alone measuring the performance of one 
aspect of DCO. For example, risk assessments and continuous monitoring programs do 
not specifically evaluate the performance of our users, neither do they assess our reaction 
time to managing an incident, nor the effectiveness of our tools.  
The NIST SP 800-137 forms the most complete strategy for assessing information 
security activities. Specifically, it recognizes that an encompassing Information Security 
Continuous Monitoring Program should begin with technology, processes, procedures, 
operating environments, and people.40 Using this assessment as a guide for a more 
specific and applicable strategy tailored to the Department of Defense (DoD), a 
comprehensive framework to measure the effectiveness of people, processes, defenses, 
and risk was developed. This framework adapts and builds on the previously discussed 
frameworks and strategies to produce a serviceable and practical guide for assessing 
DCO.  The four dimensions; people, processes, defenses, and risk, were chosen as the
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 overarching concepts to be assessed in this framework because they assimilate the 
greatest ideas put forward in the previously reviewed chapter.  
The assessment of people as a dimension is derived partly from the compliance 
frameworks, which assess the decision-making skills of management, as well as the 
incident handling frameworks that identify end users as a strength and a weakness of the 
DCO posture. The incident handling frameworks also identified system administrators 
and cyber security analysts as key players within the defense of the network.    
Processes and procedures were amongst the most discussed topics within the 
incident handling and risk management frameworks. Yet, there were very few 
meaningful strategies for assessing those processes aside from their mere completion.  
Defenses, as in tools and their value to an organization’s defense in depth 
strategy, were a major focus of the compliance frameworks. Guidance was provided to 
implement automated solutions for the collection, aggregation, analysis, and reporting of 
organization-defined metrics. Additional requirements defined by the NIST cybersecurity 
framework included tools to support the five key functions of DCO; identify, protect, 
detect, respond, and recover. The Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain (CKC) advocated 
for tools that could break the enemies process before the attacker reached actions on 
objective.  
Risk, and an organization’s ability to reduce, transfer, or accept is a key concept 
of the Risk Management Frameworks. An effective and continuous risk assessment is 
perhaps the best means to aggregate the performance of a security organization.  
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All four topics were considered enablers of COBIT 5. People, skills, and 
competencies were associated with making accurate decisions and taking remedial action. 
Processes were labeled as those activities that produce a set of outputs that support the 
achievement of IT related goals. Services, infrastructure, and applications were put 
forward as the tools that enable the processing of IT related goals. Finally, COBIT used 
information as an enabler of IT driven goals. For the purposes of this paper, the 
information enabler generally described in COBIT 5 has been specifically associated to 
risk within this framework. Again, this framework is designed to be both academic and 
practical in that it provides potential metrics for an organization to utilize. 
People 
Utilizing a tiered approach based off the previously discussed frameworks, three 
general categories of people were chosen for evaluation; management, 
analysts/administrators, and end users. Management consists of those decision makers 
who develop and decide on courses of action, implement policies and procedures, and 
purchase tools and equipment. Analysts and administrators are those employees actively 
defending the network. End users make up the bulk of the people that are evaluated and 
are perhaps the most crucial as they are the final line of defense but also the largest 
vulnerability. 
Management 
Management functions are relatively uniform throughout the strategic, 
operational, and tactical levels of DCO. However, the specific tasks and metrics for each 
task may vary. Utilizing the main functions of management identified in the Clinger-
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Cohen Act, which are similar in nature to the functions described in COBIT, we can put 
together a matrix that assesses each function at the strategic, operational, and tactical 
level.  
 
 Strategic Operational Tactical 
Acquisition and 
investment 
 
% of technologies with 
unfavorable ROI value at 
the strategic level 
% of technologies with 
unfavorable ROI value at 
the operational level 
% of technologies with 
unfavorable ROI value 
at the tactical level 
IT Architecture 
 
% of network actively 
monitored by Cyber 
Security Service Provider 
(CSSP) 
% of network actively 
monitored by Cyber 
Security Service Provider 
(CSSP) 
% of network actively 
monitored by Cyber 
Security Service 
Provider (CSSP).  
Policy 
 
% of policies which have 
not been reviewed or 
updated in the last two 
years 
% of policies which have 
not been reviewed or 
updated in the last two 
years 
% of policies which 
have not been reviewed 
or updated in the last 
two years 
Manpower development 
and training 
 
% of the cyber workforce 
meeting minimum levels 
of certification and 
training 
% of the cyber workforce 
meeting minimum levels 
of certification and 
training 
% of the cyber 
workforce meeting 
minimum levels of 
certification and 
training 
Performance results and 
technology assessments 
 
% of technologies being 
assessed  
% of technologies being 
assessed 
% of technologies being 
assessed 
Figure 6. Management Metrics 
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Analysts/Administrators 
The security workforce should be a highly trained populace. This category 
represents the people whose daily actions protect the network.  Measuring the 
effectiveness of these personnel is difficult to assess. Both qualitative and quantitative 
measurements are required. For example, the level of training required by the DoD is 
provided in the Information Assurance Workforce Improvement Program (IA). Specific 
certifications are required for different tiers of the IA workforce. 41A quantifiable metric 
that expresses the percentage of the workforce that is in compliance with this requirement 
demonstrates an actionable metric for assessing IT personnel. Another metric could 
assess the average level of training based off of certifications and degrees. While these 
metrics may be actionable, they do not necessarily demonstrate effectiveness. 
Effectiveness relates more to how well an analysts or administrator performs his/her job. 
In many cases analysts are assessed by how many tickets they close or how many alerts 
they process. This simple metric leads to quantity over quality. However, quality is 
difficult to quantify, thus a qualitative analysis is required. A standardized qualitative 
assessment of personnel by a supervisor is required.  
End Users 
 End users are potentially the most important subject to be evaluated. An end user 
may be the last line of defense if a malicious email makes its way through the boundary, 
gateway, and enterprise defenses. End users maintain the responsibility to appropriately 
report these types of incidents. Also, if a spillage occurs, it is normally an end user that 
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detects the loss of confidentiality. Yet, our users are also the most vulnerable to social 
engineering, which cannot be adequately mitigated by automated defenses. Untrained or 
negligent users also create incidents when they do not operate according to regulations 
and standards. Non-compliance through cross domain incidents, weak passwords, and 
unauthorized devices compromise the strength of the DODIN. Thus to improve our end 
user detection capability and reduce the vulnerability associated with social engineering 
and non-compliance we must train our users to a high standard. Metrics associated with 
users must be able to identify deviations from baseline trends which may be the result of 
personnel moves, changes in management, or simply the amount of time since the last 
mandated training.  Decision makers must be able to identify trends in user reported 
detections, cross domain violations, and social engineering compromises and provide 
focused, out of cycle training.   The characteristics of end users do not change from the 
tactical to the strategic level; therefore we can develop uniform metrics for determining 
the effectiveness of our users.  
Users as a Layer of Defense 
 Although users are not normally considered a layer of our defense in depth 
strategy, it is the user’s responsibility to report social engineering attacks. Timely self-
reporting by the user may decrease the incident handling life cycle. Analysts must 
investigate vast quantities of alerts; however, if a user reports a compromise on the 
system the time to detection is greatly decreased.  Metrics that prove the effectiveness of 
our users might include: 
• % of users affected by spear phishing email that reported the incident 
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• % of users affected by spillage that reported the incident 
A more general metric for the percentage of incidents that were self-reported is not 
valuable because users cannot identify many incidents.  
Users Vulnerability to Social Engineering 
 Social engineers violate inherent human trust. Metrics for determining user’s 
vulnerability to social engineering could include: 
• The % of users that clicked on a malicious link or attachment in a spear phishing 
message 
• The % of users that visited or attempted to visit malicious sites 
 A useful approach to gauge the user’s vulnerability to these types of threats is to 
develop a continuous monitoring program that incorporates the periodic assessment of 
users. Management can implement fake spear phishing campaigns and incorporate 
metrics into their overall DCO scorecard.  
Users Non-Compliance 
 Non-compliance activity potentially exposes the DODIN to increased risk as a 
result of the action or inaction of users. This includes cross-domain violations, 
installation of unapproved software, connecting USB devices, etc. A simpler approach 
would be to utilize the total number of non-compliance reports. Metrics for determining 
the compliance of users may include: 
• The number of Cross-Domain Violations 
• The number of installations of unapproved software 
• The number of unapproved devices connected to the DODIN 
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Processes 
Process is a general term that can be used in many different ways. COBIT 
describes a process as an organized set of practices and activities to achieve certain 
objectives and produce a set of outputs in support of achieving overall IT related goals.42 
Craig Simmons defines processes as making good decisions about IT. 43 Both of these 
definitions are correct. For the purpose of this paper, we will examine how to assess the 
effectiveness of an organization’s processes in terms of the iterative decision process 
known as the OODA Loop.  
 Colonel John Boyd originated the OODA Loop after analyzing the superiority of 
American fighters in the Korean War. He hypothesized that four unique steps create a 
loop that characterizes each process: observe, orient decide, and act.44 The goal of the 
OODA Loop is to create an environment which facilitates a more rapid execution of the 
loop then one’s enemy or competitor. In terms of cybersecurity, the use of the OODA 
Loop has already been widely incorporated into theory and publications. The CJCSM 
6510.10 Incident Handling Manual includes a detailed section on which incident handling 
processes are associated with which phases of the OODA Loop. 45Yet there are no 
metrics associated with each phase of the OODA Loop to be used as part of an 
assessment. Furthermore, the OODA Loop’s application is far greater than incident 
handling alone.  
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OODA Loop for Incident Handling 
CJCSM 6510.01B synchronizes the incident handling life cycle to the OODA 
Loop. It describes the observe phase in terms of monitoring and detecting anomalous 
activity. The orient phase is characterized by collecting and analyzing information about 
the incident. The decide phase involves course of action development and is followed by 
the act phase in which the course of action is executed.46 In order to make these phases 
measureable, certain metrics had to be generated. Ericka Chickowski suggests two 
important measurements regarding the time to detection and the time to response.47 By 
reducing the average time to detect in the observe phase, more time is provided to the 
defender in the orient and decide phase of the OODA Loop. The time to respond 
measures the entire OODA Loop process. Reducing the average time to respond should 
reduce the overall cost of incidents.  These flash to bang analytics measuring the delta 
between incident and observation or action, provide an effective measurement of an 
incident response program.  
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Figure 7. Incident Handling OODA Loop 
OODA Loop for Overall DCO Processes 
The OODA Loop is an iterative cycle that is designed to understand and improve 
processes. There are a lot more processes involved in DCO than incident response. The 
NIST Cybersecurity Framework presents five functions that cover the core cybersecurity 
activities; identify, protect, detect, respond, and recover. These core functions are then 
designed to be broken down into categories and subcategories that form the baseline 
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actions of cyber security.48 Utilizing the OODA Loop, we can place these functions 
within the iterative cycle to assess how well we are executing DCO processes.  
Figure seven illustrates the OODA Loop assessing the Vulnerability Management 
process. The NIST SP 800-40 Guide to Enterprise Patch Management Technologies 
defines Patch Management as “the process for identify, acquiring, installing, and 
verifying patches for products and systems.” 49 Placing this process within the OODA 
Loop, we can derive several measurements to measure our reaction to patch management. 
This concept of the vulnerability management OODA loop is not revolutionary and has 
been previously discussed by the Center for Internet Security.50 The key is to provide 
meaningful measurements to evaluate DODIN Ops and DCO processes like vulnerability 
management and incident response within the context of a decision cycle such as the 
OODA Loop. Within the observe phase, we measure our ability to identify the 
vulnerability by taking the delta between when the vulnerability was made public through 
security bulletins or Information Assurance Vulnerability Management (IAVM) 
messages and when the organization identified the vulnerability. The orient phase is 
focused on assessing the vulnerability within the operating environment. Here, the patch 
is acquired and a risk assessment is conducted. The decide phase is characterized by 
developing a remediation course of action and may be measured by the time to test the 
patch. The final phase of the patch management OODA Loop examines the patch rollout 
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and subsequent monitoring of the operating environment. The obvious measurement for 
this phase is the time it takes to implement the patch organization wide.    
 
  
Figure 8. Vulnerability Management OODA Loop 
Using the OODA Loop to Assess DCO Against Past Performance, Peers, Standards, and 
the Enemy 
The OODA Loop has been applied to many different areas of study, from 
business, to medical, to the military, for which it was originally created. The design was 
intended to increase the speed of the entire decision making process over that of the 
enemy.  While means have been put forward in which to measure one’s own OODA 
Loop, comparing one’s own OODA Loop to the enemies is a difficult task in terms of 
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cyber. This requires the defender to completely understand the actions and intent of the 
enemy. The Lockheed Martin CKC provides the leading theory for assessing the actions 
and intent of the adversary in the seven phases required for an attacker to execute actions 
on objective. Therefore, we can measure our OODA Loop versus the enemy’s by placing 
the OODA Loop process within the CKC. Success equates to any time our OODA Loop 
executes before the enemy reaches actions on objective. However, we can show 
improvement in our OODA Loop by executing our defenses higher in the kill chain.   
 
 
Figure 9. OODA Loop within the Context of CKC 
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Many of the processes required for DCO cannot be adequately assessed against an 
enemy. In these cases there are three options for measuring the effectiveness of a given 
process. The first is past performance or the demonstration of improvement or decline 
over time. The OODA Loop uses time as a system of measurement. For example, if 
management can show that they have reduced the average observe phase of a process 
over the last quarter from one hour to forty minutes, then this is a valid and actionable 
metric for our commanders.  Another option is to take the metrics of the OODA Loop 
and assess performance against peer organizations. This option is only available if like 
organizations are utilizing the same measurements. For example, if one organization 
measures success of the observe phase of incident handling by the amount of time it takes 
to identify an intrusion and another measures the amount of time it takes to generate a 
report on an incident then the two cannot be accurately compared. Another option is to 
assess an organization based off of standardized criteria. Currently CJCSM 6510.01B 
provides certain standards for incident handling based on the type of incident, initial risk 
assessment, and the amount of time required to report on these incidents. However, these 
standardized report timelines do not encompass all aspects of the OODA Loop. 
Therefore, standardized metrics should be put forward based on the OODA Loop for all 
functions of DCO.  
Defenses 
Most organizations create a DCO posture that is built to support a defense in 
depth strategy. Various tools are used at many different layers to support this strategy. 
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However, most organizations do not have an effective way to measure the effectiveness 
of these tools or gauge their return on investment.  
 Figure 9 provides a crucial answer to measuring a defense in depth strategy. 
Utilizing the OODA loop discussed previously, tools are placed into the phase in which 
they execute their mission; observe, orient, decide, and act. Within each phase, tools are 
further broken down by the defense in depth layer in which they operate. For this 
purpose, the boundary layer is considered to be the region that touches both the ISP and 
the organization’s internal network. The enterprise layer is the region in which enterprise 
services must pass. For example, this may be an email gateway. The third section is the 
regional layer. Many organizations are subdivided by regions and maintain separate 
security stacks of firewalls, intrusion protection systems, access control lists, etc. The 
final layer is the endpoint, which is protected by antivirus and host based security 
systems. This particular defense in depth model is only a general image of what a defense 
in depth posture may look like. Each organization will be different and will be required to 
determine which tools and which layers operate at which phase of the OODA Loop. The 
table below sets up the structure from which to evaluate individual incidents. It builds on 
the metrics discussed in the incident response processes and overlays individual tools at 
each layer, providing the commander with an actionable evaluation of the different tools. 
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Figure 10. Defenses 
There are several applications for this method of evaluation. Utilizing a similar 
concept proposed in Lockheed Martin’s whitepaper on The Seven Ways to Apply the 
Cyber Kill Chain with a Threat Intelligence Platform, this table provides a simple return 
on investment. This information can easily be aggregated for a commander to identify 
which tools are observing malicious traffic and which tools are not. Gaps in coverage can 
lead to increased investment expenditure. This concept also illustrates layers of 
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resiliency, depicting tools with subsequent observations of threat activity as well as tools 
that introduced countermeasures after the initial countermeasure was implemented. 51 
Improving on the Lockheed Martin concept, the incorporation of the OODA 
Loop, as well as the layered defense approach, enables leadership to clearly identify 
delays in the OODA Loop and prioritize investment in technologies that will decrease the 
time it takes to observe, orient, decide, and act in response to an intrusion. Furthermore, 
this process accurately pits the defender’s OODA Loop against the enemy’s by 
demonstrating at which stage of the CKC the defender was able to mitigate the attempted 
intrusion. Effectiveness could be measured over time by showing the defender’s OODA 
Loop breaking the CKC in the earlier stages. In order to accurately apply this concept, 
data points must be automatically captured at each stage of the process to create a 
chronological record of when each tool was utilized and at what point in time.   
Risk 
Perhaps the best way to measure the overall effectiveness of an organization is to 
qualitatively measure the amount of risk to that particular organization. Both the NIST 
Risk Management Framework and the NIST Continuous Monitoring Program provide 
general instructions explaining how to conduct this type of assessment.  Risk should be 
scored in a way that aggregates the risk to each system, in order to provide an overall 
score for an organization’s collection of systems.52 However, neither publication provides 
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a specific strategy for continuously scoring risk. In fact, SP 800-137 even suggests that it 
is impractical to continuously score risk in near real time, instead relying on periodic 
assessments. It is this paper’s argument that risk must be scored in real time and must 
take into consideration threats and vulnerabilities as they are identified as well as 
safeguards that are put into place.   
In order to provide realistic measurements for continuously assessing risk for all 
information systems, we must return to examining the formula for risk and the process 
involved with assessing risk. The NIST Risk Management Framework defines risk as “ a 
measure of the extent to which an entity is threatened by a potential circumstance or 
event, and a function of: (i) the adverse impacts that would arise if the circumstance or 
event occurs; and (ii) the likelihood of occurrence.”53 Applying this definition to a 
concept that enables a continuous risk assessment, we can utilize currently generated 
reporting with qualitatively assigned values. Figure ten illustrates this concept. 
Intelligence reports provide information on threats, which can be categorized by severity 
and tied to the vulnerabilities they exploit. Additional vulnerabilities are identified in 
Information Assurance Vulnerability Management bulletins and are associated with 
individual systems or assets. These assets are prioritized as either standard assets or task 
critical assets that are tied to an organization’s mission essential tasks. Finally, incident 
reports provide the level of exposure of these assets. The product of this formula equals 
risk, which is then subtracted from the control gap of those countermeasures that reduce 
the exposure of assets, ultimately resulting in residual risk. This residual risk is then 
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utilized as a measure of performance which can be trended over a period of time 
indicating an increase or decrease in the overall risk of an organization.   
 
 
Figure 11. Qualitative Continuous Risk Assessment 
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CHAPTER IV 
APPLYING THE DCO FRAMEWORK 
People, processes, defenses, and risk make up the core components of this 
framework. Up to this point, the paper has provided an analysis of each of these elements 
as well as numerous concepts to evaluate each one. This chapter provides a specific 
reference for identifying the current baseline effectiveness of an organization as well as 
the ability to assess the change in performance over time. Specifically, it enables an 
organization to measure the attainment of specified goals. This process is similar to the 
NIST Cybersecurity Framework.    
Presented are three methods for transforming the framework from an academic 
study to a practical implementation of the framework by modifying processes, tools, and 
reporting structures that are already in place. Additionally, this chapter explores potential 
Measures of Performance and Measures of Effectiveness tied to assessing task 
accomplishment and the end state of a mission.   
The Framework Fundamentals 
• Elements: The framework provides a standard of measurement that can be 
analyzed to determine the overall effectiveness of the core elements of DCO; 
People, Processes, Defenses, and Risk. These elements form the four basic 
building blocks that must be assessed within each organization.
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• Levels: Each element is designed to be evaluated at different levels or tiers based 
upon the evaluating organizations role. Yet, the common method of evaluation 
designs itself to roll a single organization into an overall evaluation of all tiers. 
• Category: Each element is subdivided into categories extending the evaluation to 
target specific DCO functions. 
• Ends/Ways: Individual categories have an end state or a targeted objective called 
ends. Each end requires the accomplishment of certain task to achieve the 
endstate. These task are called ways.  
• Measure: End states are assessed according to Measures of Effectiveness 
(MOEs), “a criterion used to assess changes in the behavior, capability, or 
operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, 
achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect.”54 Ways are assessed 
according to Measures of Performance (MOP), “a criterion used to assess friendly 
actions that are tied to measuring task accomplishment.”55 
Tailoring the Framework 
The process of implementing the framework requires customization on the part of 
the organization and supports agile development to the organization’s requirements. The 
elements, levels, categories, ends/ways, and measures are intended to be manipulated and 
merely provide a baseline for an organization to build from. An organization may be 
tempted to remove some of the rudiments of the framework if it believes it is already 
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successfully achieving the desired outcome so that reporting structures can focus on 
improving gaps. However, caution should be granted, as this may leave an organization 
vulnerable to complacency. As new objectives are improved upon, foundational 
objectives may slack.  
The first step to tailoring the framework entails identifying an organizations basic 
requirements. When building out processes, this means ensuring that all Mission 
Essential Tasks and Mission Essential Functions are identified. Each Mission Essential 
Function and Task should at a minimum be assessed by the time to completion and the 
level of completion, though the specific means to measure level of task completion must 
be further developed. The framework only identifies the most basic categories of people 
within an organization. During this phase of tailoring the framework, additional 
categories should be identified to best support the organization. This may include 
subcategorizing users into mission functions such as intelligence analysts, incident 
responders, Cyber Protection Team members, etc. Additionally, tool requirements should 
be identified utilizing use cases to defend against known threats. 
Once the requirements are identified, an adjustment needs to be made to the 
scoring rubric to ensure each is accounted for and scored appropriately. This may entail 
modifying the levels, categories, ends and ways. Specific tool requirements may generate 
additional end states and objectives.   
After an organization has built tailored end states and subsequent tasks to achieve 
those end states, it must develop MOEs and MOPs. These MOEs and MOPs should 
deliver a repeatable assessment metric that can be assessed against past performance, 
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peers, standards, and if possible the enemy. A standard metric rubric should be utilized 
that documents the metric with a specific identifier and describes the capability of the 
metric as well as how it should be applied. As discussed in previous chapters, metrics 
should be above all else actionable and repeatable in addition to providing situational 
awareness. Furthermore, metrics should be evaluated over time to identify progressing or 
declining trends.  If standards have been developed, then the metric may be evaluated 
against policy, however, if no standard has been put forth then evaluation should take 
place against near peer organizations. Finally, in certain cases, the metric may be 
evaluated against the adversary.  
 
 
Figure 12. Metric Rubric 
NIST SP 800-55 and MITRE’s Cyber Resiliency Metrics provide examples of 
detailed templates for documenting and evaluating individual metrics. The table above 
demonstrates a basic template for documenting metrics. The MITRE example also 
includes a measurement scale, collection methods, data storage methods, cost associated 
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with collection, and supporting strategy.56 The NIST template includes a few other 
characteristics such as target or threshold for achieving success and frequency of data 
collection and analysis.57  These additional attributes are useful and the individual 
organization should decide on the level of depth necessary for their metric rubric.  
The next phase should include conducting the assessment and scoring of each 
MOE and MOP. The specific means to measure the metric should be outlined in the 
metric table designed in the previous phase. The assessment phase is iterative and is 
designed to be continuously assessed. However, a snapshot must be taken in order 
provide analysis.  
In the final phase of the framework, the results of the assessment are reviewed 
and analyzed to determine trends, areas for improvement or investment, and actionable 
information to support decision making. Graphs and scorecards should be utilized to 
provide an easily understood explanation of progressing or declining trends.   
Additional Applications of the Framework 
This DCO framework is intended to provide a useful and effective guide for 
organizations attempting to measure the effectiveness of their cybersecurity programs. 
Though comprehensive in nature, it is currently not postured to support wide spread 
adoption without the use of already existing reporting mechanisms.	Current reporting 
mechanisms have been previously described in Chapter 2 as being limited in scope and 
purpose.  These existing reporting mechanisms are not perfect and have been 
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implemented on top of the existing architecture as opposed to being built into the 
infrastructure.  However, if these existing mechanisms are adapted to assess the people, 
processes, defenses, and risk to the organization utilizing concepts such as the OODA 
loop, the Cyber Kill Chain, and defense in depth within the context of Measures of 
Performance and Measures of Effectiveness, then they will provide an adequate 
assessment of the effectiveness of that organization. For example, the Continuous 
Monitoring and Risk Scoring (CMRS) system already provides a basic mechanism for 
evaluating the risk to an organization in near real time. Additional features could be 
included to support the assessment of certain processes, the effectiveness of tools, and to 
a certain extent the evaluation of users or administrators. Understandably, a single tool 
will likely not be able to aggregate all required evaluations, some of which may be 
qualitative in nature, yet it could provide a basic standardization for many of the metrics 
across various organizations. Likely, numerous other tools for evaluating people, 
processes, defenses, and risk will have to be developed. Monitoring and Reporting tools 
are only half of the requirement. Policy must also support the adoption of a 
comprehensive assessment. The DoD Cybersecurity Scorecard would be an excellent 
instrument for this policy, through the assimilation of additional categories of 
measurement as well as a more refined scoring mechanism that is not simply a binary 
pass or fail for each objective.  
Evaluation and Justification 
Due to the sensitive nature of an assessment of this magnitude on DoD systems, a 
trial was not feasible for incorporation into this paper. Instead this framework was 
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initially validated by eight industry professionals with 115 years of combined DCO 
experience. The evaluation was a modified Delphi type analysis with expert consensus. It 
was determined that two rounds of questions augmented with supplemental discussion 
would adequately provide expert consensus on the fitness of this framework. The eight 
experts that validated this paper during round one were an average age of 38 years old 
and held bachelors or master’s degrees within the computer science or information 
technology fields. Additionally, they maintained an average of three industry respected 
information security certifications.   
The initial questionnaire was developed based on research and analysis of DCO as 
well as the main concepts promoted throughout the paper. The questionnaire contained 
33 questions distributed across the six major parts of the paper. The industry 
professionals were asked to evaluate each sub concept on a five-point scale from strongly 
disagree to strongly agree. The questionnaire was made available through the UNCG 
affiliated qualtrics platform, enabling respondents to answer questions securely and at 
their leisure.  The detailed results of the evaluation are presented within Appendix B. 
The second round of questions focused in on the trends identified during the 
initial round. For example, questions in which there was widespread agreement or 
disagreement of more than 75% were withdrawn from the second round, as consensus 
was considered achieved. Additionally, the results of the first round were made available 
to all the respondents.  The intent was to gain consensus on the validity or invalidity of 
the debated concepts.  This form of modified Delphi analysis has been utilized in medical 
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studies to identify desirable characteristics of review.58  In total, there were eight 
questions in which expert consensus had not been achieved during the first round. Three 
of these eight questions were re-worded for clarity without losing their meaning. In total, 
eight respondents chose to participate in the second round, providing expert consensus 
and feedback aimed at the originally contested notions. However, five of the eight 
respondents although invited, had not participated in the first round of questions.  This 
was perceived as a benefit as it added fresh perspectives to the consensus garnering 
processes.  The second round of experts averaged 39 years of age, with 124 years of 
combined experience, and an average of 3 industry respected certifications. 
Of note, there was widespread agreement on the scope of the thesis.  Most 
prominently, all the respondents agreed on the need to develop a comprehensive 
framework for evaluating DCO. In terms of the points made regarding the assessment 
process, there was a marginal lack of consensus as to whether MOPs and MOEs are 
effective forms of assessments as well as the asymmetric nature of cyber warfare. 
Additionally, there was a significant neutral opinion on whether economy of force 
strategies such as the ability of machines to execute the decision process and minimize 
the need for human interaction should be applied.  
The overwhelming majority of the respondents agreed in the second round, that 
economy of force strategies that expand the ability of machines to execute the decision 
process and minimize the need for human interaction should be applied. However, there 
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was some level of reluctance to apply this logic holistically. For example, some of the 
experts proposed constraining machine level decision making to the most mundane tasks 
and broad-based threats while inserting human decision making processes against 
advanced persistent threats. This debate highlighted the fact that the time it takes to make 
a decision or complete a process should not be the only measure to evaluate success. 
Disagreement also occurred when discussing the challenges associated with 
evaluating DCO, specifically, how commanders measure success without a framework. 
25% of the respondents disagreed with the paper’s analysis that assessments currently 
come in the form of infrequent security audits, vulnerability assessments, and penetration 
tests. During the second round, this question received widespread agreement and even 
comments on how some of the individuals had personal experience with this challenge.  
Perhaps the most notable contention involved the frameworks discussed in 
Chapter 2 and their applicability to support a comprehensive DCO assessment. Only 50% 
agreed with the decision to use incident handling, compliance, governance, and risk 
management frameworks as a baseline.	Unfortunately, during the second round, there 
were still notable concerns with the types of frameworks referenced to create this 
approach, with the concept achieving only 57% agreement.  Suggestions were made to 
include business process analysis as well as asset management frameworks. Based on the 
requirements of the given organization, the framework can be tailored to assess 
businesses functions and asset management within the element of processes. Many of the 
recommended MOEs and MOPs are derived from COBIT, the NIST Risk Management 
Framework and subsequently the NIST Cybersecurity Framework, which takes into 
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consideration both business processes and asset management. Additionally, the element 
of People, specifically addresses acquisition and investment as well as IT architecture, 
key components of asset management. 
The questions involving the proposed framework received widespread agreement 
and all concepts received at least 75% agreement. Of note, there was unanimous 
agreement that a comprehensive DCO framework should evaluate people, processes, 
defenses, and risk, the most basic concept of this paper. However, there were four 
questions in which 25% of the respondents either had a neutral or opposing view of a 
concept. Risk was perhaps the most deliberated topic of the second round discussion on 
the proposed framework, with respondents suggesting that the measurement for risk 
should take into consideration the certainty or uncertainty that an actor has knowledge of 
the asset. Suggestions were also made to weight each asset in terms of its criticality. This 
paper embraces the concept of weighting assets and measures assets as either standard or 
task critical. The user of this framework may wish to explore non-binary options to 
further weight assets by means of tiers or cost as a form of measure.  There was also 
unanimous agreement on the suitability of utilizing a defense in depth posture that 
captures data points in terms of the OODA loop and the Cyber Kill Chain. 
The concepts associated with applying the framework were widely accepted 
during Round I. As previously mentioned, this finding is particularly significant as there 
was unanimous agreement that a comprehensive DCO framework should evaluate 
people, processes, defenses, and risk, the most basic concept of this paper. This was 
further validated with unanimous consensus that the framework fundamentals provide a 
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suitable structure to assess people, processes, defenses, and risk. There was also 
widespread agreement on the concepts of applying the DCO framework.  
Conclusion 
In conclusion, there is a clear desire for a comprehensive framework that assesses 
the efficacy of DCO. Without the adoption of a framework there will naturally be 
unproductive tasking, inefficient spending and ineffective reporting.  A framework 
should support military doctrine for assessments and frame measurements in terms of 
MOEs and MOPs. Additionally, it should support continuous assessments that provide 
actionable information to decision makers.  A truly comprehensive framework assesses 
people, processes, defenses, and risk. Assessments should be gauged over time to 
demonstrate progress but also be measured against standards, peers, and the adversary. 
The framework should not be a static list of measurements but rather support tailoring the 
metrics to the organization’s requirements.  These metrics should be documented 
utilizing a standardized rubric that assesses the capability and performance of the metrics. 
The final results should be reviewed and analyzed to determine trends, areas for 
improvement or investment and actionable information to support decision making. 
However, current reporting mechanisms and policy must be adapted in order to capture 
these metrics suggested by this framework. 
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APPENDIX A 
FRAMEWORK SCORING 
This appendix provides the central integrity of the framework for evaluating the 
success of an organization. The below tables provide the elements, levels, categories, 
ends/ways, and measurements for assessing DCO. It represents a baseline concept for 
assessments and is designed to be tailored and customized to an individual organization.  
Table 1. People Scoring 
The element People is scored at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. 
However, many of the tasks at one level are similar to the tasks at other levels. The 
categories for people are broken down into Management, Analyst and Administrators, 
and Users. Specific end states are assigned to each category. The end states for 
management involve improvements in acquisition and investment, IT architecture, policy, 
manpower development and training, and finally assessments. Analysts and 
administrators are to be assessed on improvement of their skills and certifications as well 
as their compliance to policies and standards, and their aptitude for detecting and 
reporting incidents. Finally, users are assessed on their compliance and resistance to 
social engineering as well as their ability to detect and report incidents. Specific means 
for accomplishing each end state are provided with a corresponding MOE/MOP. 
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Table 1. People Scoring 
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Table 2. Process Scoring 
 The Process Scoring table replaces levels with the OODA loop and incorporates 
the five categories of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework; Identify, Protect, Detect, 
Respond, and Recover. In this way, the framework incorporates the functions, categories, 
and subcategories presented in the NIST Cybersecurity Framework (blue)59 and expands 
upon the NIST framework by tailoring specific DCO end states and objectives (red) 
within the context of the OODA loop.  Furthermore, the process scoring table measures 
each MOE and MOP individually, assessing the time to complete each objective within 
the framework of the OODA loop and the level of completion.  NIST Special Publication 
800-55 describes these forms of metrics as measures of effectiveness and efficiency. 60 
																																																											
59	National	Institute	of	Standards	and	Technology.	Framework	for	Improving	Critical	Infrastructure	
Cybersecurity	
60	National	Institute	of	Standards	and	Technology.	Performance	Measurement	Guide	for	Information	
Security	
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Table 2. Process Scoring 
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Table 3. Defense Scoring 
 Defense scoring utilizes the logical placement of tools according to a defense in 
depth layers as levels. This approach measures the effectiveness of defenses in categories 
of Processes, Resilience, Strength, and Return on Investment. The effectiveness of the 
defense processes returns measurements to the OODA loop, referencing the time it takes 
for sensors and tools to detect, analyze, develop mitigations, and implement 
countermeasures. Resilience is assessed in terms of the redundant nature of the defenses 
and where strength is the overall success the defense in the reduction of incidents. Return 
on investment observes the capability of tools in comparison to the cost of the tools. This 
analysis provides a comprehensive assessment of the effectiveness of an organizations 
Defenses.  
 
Table 3. Defense Scoring 
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Table 4. Risk Scoring 
The table for risk scoring is rather simple. The levels, categories, ends, means, 
and MOPs/MOEs are straightforward. At each level the objective is to reduce risk which 
is accomplished by implementing controls. The measurement is simply the amount of 
risk before and after controls are put into place. However, determining a value for risk is 
exceedingly difficult. Each organization must develop a quantitative or qualitative 
process for achieving this value. In chapter 3, a method was presented to continuously 
assess risk in near real time by identifying threats, vulnerabilities, and exposure of assets 
with qualitatively assigned values and subtracting this value from the control gap, 
providing the residual risk value.  
 
Table 4. Risk Scoring 
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APPENDIX B 
EVALUATION FORM 
As	part	of	my	Master’s	thesis	at	the	University	of	North	Carolina	at	Greensboro,	I	am	conducting	
a	survey	to	validate	the	ideas	and	concepts	put	forward	in	my	thesis.		Any	information	obtained	
in	connection	with	this	study	will	remain	confidential	and	only	be	associated	to	an	anonymous	
industry	professional.		
Professional’s	Details:	
Name:	___________________				Age:	________			Years	of	experience	within	industry:	_________	
Education:	_______________________	Certifications:	__________________________________	
Strongly	Disagree	(1)	 Disagree	(2)	 Neutral	(3)	 Agree	(4)	 Strongly	Agree	(5)	
	
Questions	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 Comments	
Scope	 	 	 	 	 	 	
There	is	a	need	to	develop	a	comprehensive	
framework	for	evaluating	DCO.	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Without	a	comprehensive	framework	for	
evaluating	DCO	there	will	be	unproductive	
tasking,	inefficient	spending	and	ineffective	
reporting.	
	 	 	 	 	 	
DODIN	Ops	and	DCO	are	inherently	
interconnected	and	should	be	evaluated	
utilizing	the	same	overarching	framework.	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Assessments	 	 	 	 	 	 	
The	assessment	process	should	be	continuous	
in	nature.	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Assessments	should	be	planned	prior	to	the	
engineering	of	our	networks,	the	
establishment	of	sensor	grids,	and	the	
employment	of	internal	defensive	measures.	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Metrics	should	provide	an	effective	
assessment	at	all	three	levels	of	warfare.	
	 	 	 	 	 	
MOPs	and	MOEs	are	effective	forms	of	
assessments.		
	 	 	 	 	 	
Assessments	are	especially	effective	if	they	
incorporate	both	quantitative	and	qualitative	
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analysis.	
Metrics	vary	in	scale	and	purpose	from	
situational	awareness	to	actionable	
information.	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Defensive	Cyber	Operations	as	well	as	
Offensive	Cyber	Operations	are	both	
symmetric	as	well	as	asymmetric.	
	 	 	 	 	 	
When	possible,	we	should	attempt	to	utilize	
the	asymmetric	capabilities	of	DCO	and	assess	
the	effectiveness	of	these	capabilities.	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Resources	such	as	financial	capital,	processing	
power,	and	human	resources	assist	an	
organization	in	gaining	the	asymmetric	
advantage	within	the	cyber	domain.	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Economy	of	force	strategies	should	be	applied	
that	expand	the	ability	of	machines	to	execute	
the	decision	process	and	minimize	the	need	for	
human	interaction.	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Current	Framework	Challenges	 	 	 	 	 	 	
DoD	doctrine	often	separates	the	functional	
nature	of	cyber	security	into	compliance	and	
network	hardening	(DODIN	Ops)	and	hunting	
and	response	actions	(DCO-IDM).	This	
fractional	method	of	evaluating	DCO	as	a	
partial	concept	means	that	we	are	not	
providing	the	commander	with	an	adequate	
representation	of	how	our	conceptual	shield	is	
prepared	for	enemy	engagement.	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
The	DODIN	is	a	disparate	network	of	networks,	
operated	by	many	services	and	agencies.	This	
mesh	has	created	an	incongruent	reporting	
structure	that	is	not	only	difficult	to	defend,	
but	near	impossible	to	assess.	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Without	a	framework	to	continuously	evaluate	
DCO	as	a	whole	of	effort,	commander’s	resort	
to	infrequent	security	audits,	vulnerability	
assessments,	and	penetration	test.	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Frameworks	 	 	 	 	 	 	
A	literature	review	of	Incident	handling,	
compliance,	governance	and	risk	management	
frameworks	provides	a	satisfactory	baseline	to	
support	a	comprehensive	DCO	assessment.			
	 	 	 	 	 	
Proposed	Framework	 	 	 	 	 	 	
A	comprehensive	DCO	framework	should	 	 	 	 	 	 	
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evaluate	people,	processes,	defenses,	and	risk.		
People	should	be	measured	in	terms	of	
management,	analysts/administrators,	and	
users.		
	 	 	 	 	 	
Management	should	be	evaluated	in	terms	of	
acquisition	and	investment,	IT	architecture,	
policy,	manpower	development	and	training,	
and	performance	results	and	technology	
assessments.		
	 	 	 	 	 	
Qualitative	performance	assessments	of	
analysts/administrators	can	be	more	effective	
then	quantitative	assessments.		
	 	 	 	 	 	
End	users	should	be	evaluated	as	a	layer	of	
defense	and	as	a	vulnerability.		
	 	 	 	 	 	
The	OODA	loop	is	an	effective	form	of	
assessment	for	processes.		
	 	 	 	 	 	
The	OODA	loop	within	the	context	of	the	Cyber	
Kill	Chain	provides	a	means	to	assess	our	
incident	handling	processes	versus	the	
adversary.		
	 	 	 	 	 	
Utilizing	a	defense	in	depth	posture	that	
captures	data	points	in	terms	of	the	OODA	
loop	and	Cyber	Kill	Chain	assesses	
effectiveness,	resilience,	and	return	on	
investment.		
	 	 	 	 	 	
Risk	should	be	scored	in	a	way	that	aggregates	
the	risk	to	each	system	to	provide	an	overall	
score	for	an	organization’s	collection	of	
systems.	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Risk	must	be	scored	in	real	time	and	must	take	
into	consideration	threats	and	vulnerabilities	
as	they	are	identified	as	well	as	safeguards	that	
are	put	into	place.	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Residual	risk	should	be	utilized	as	a	measure	of	
performance.		
	 	 	 	 	 	
Applying	the	DCO	Framework	 	 	 	 	 	 	
The	framework	fundamentals	provide	a	
suitable	structure	to	assess	people,	processes,	
defenses,	and	risk.		
	 	 	 	 	 	
The	process	to	tailor	the	framework	to	an	
organizations	specific	needs	supports	agility	
and	does	not	limit	an	organization	to	a	simple	
set	of	metrics.		
	 	 	 	 	 	
A	standard	metric	rubric	should	be	utilized	that	 	 	 	 	 	 	
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documents	the	metric	with	a	specific	identifier	
and	describes	the	capability	of	the	metric	as	
well	as	how	it	should	be	applied.	
Metrics	should	be	above	all	else	actionable	and	
repeatable	in	addition	to	being	situational.	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Metrics	should	be	evaluated	over	time,	and	
against	standards,	peers,	and	when	possible	
the	adversary.		
	 	 	 	 	 	
Assessments	should	be	reviewed	and	analyzed	
to	determine	trends,	areas	for	improvement	or	
investment,	and	actionable	information	to	
support	decision	making.	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Current	reporting	mechanisms	and	policy	must	
be	adapted	in	order	to	capture	the	metrics	
suggested	by	this	framework.		
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APPENDIX C 
EVALUATION REPORT 
Round I Expert Consensus: Scope 
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Round I Expert Consensus: Assessments 
 
Round II Expert Consensus: Assessments 
 
Round I Expert Consensus: Current Framework Challenges 
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Round II Expert Consensus: Current Framework Challenges 
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Round I Expert Consensus: Frameworks 
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Round II Expert Consensus: Frameworks 
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Round I Expert Consensus: Proposed Framework 
 
Round II Expert Consensus: Proposed Framework 
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Round I Expert Consensus: Applying the DCO Framework 
 
